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ABSTRACT Most active research in Host and Network Intrusion Detection Systems are only able to detect
attacks of the computer systems and attacks at the network layer, which are not sufficient to counteract
SOAP/REST or XML/JSON-related attacks. In dealing with the problem of anomaly detection in web
service message datasets, this paper proposes an anomaly detection system called the Online Adaptive Deep-
Packet Inspector (O-ADPI) for web service message attacks classification. The proposed approach relies
on multiple statistical methods which use Unigram-based Weighting Scheme (UWS) that combines text
mining techniques with a set of different statistical criteria for Feature Selection Engine (FSE) to effectively
and efficiently explore optimal subspaces in detecting anomalies embedded deep in the high dimensional
feature subspaces. We utilize a supervised intrusion detection algorithm based on mahalanobis distance
map classifier. As web service attacks can be classified into anomaly and normal, the task of anomaly
detection can be modeled as a classification problem. The O-ADPI model was assessed for F-value, true
positive rate (TPR), and false positive rate (FPR) in order to evaluate the detectionx performance of O-
ADPI against different type of feature selections engines with corresponding PCs for each service message-
specific. The experiments were performed using the REST-IDS Dataset 2015 and the results demonstrated
that the proposed O-ADPI model achieved the best results in each message-specific service.
INDEX TERMS Anomaly Detection, Feature Selection Engine, Mahalanobis Distance Map, Web Service
Attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE use of computer networks has now become im-perative to organizations. This fact broadens the scope
for network attackers and increases the damage that these
attacks may cause. These security dangers are particularly
genuine for Web Service (WS) applications, where delicate
and a huge sum of business-related confidential information
are being transit through the internet. Although the degree of
security risk among traditional network intrusions from high-
est to lowest is known as U2R> R2U> DoS> Probes, another
causation risk factor has been the complexity of modern web
service platforms, whereby web services intrusions are now
having new features of vulnerabilities that make them unique.
As a result, a substantial fraction of cyber-attacks against
organizations with Internet presence targets their web-based
services [1].
Web services are independent platforms that are intro-
duced to cater interoperable standards, provide application
flexibility, integration and data communication between sys-
tems [2]. This allows more and more software applications to
be built on internet-enabled WS platforms, particularly Busi-
ness Intelligence (BI) and e-commerce application. However,
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applications use XML or Json message to communicate with
each other via the application layer using the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) standard [3]. Therefore, the asso-
ciated port for these protocols (i.e., port 80) needs to be ac-
cessible at all times to support functionality and services. The
application layer is therefore open to different types of threats
such as XML injection, SON injection, Structured Query
Language (SQL) Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
oversized payload and recursive payload resulting in XML
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
Despite the risk, unfortunately all standard security appli-
ances such as network firewalls, content filters or network
intrusion detection/prevention systems are not able to block
the intruders from attacking the web services [4]. This is
because current IDSs are incapable to deduce payload attacks
inside the XML and JSON messages at the service level,
hence insufficient for detecting and preventing the concealed
threats in apparent constant network traffics [5]. In addition,
although the WS-Security on WS offers confidentiality to
sensible data, XML encryption can obscure message infor-
mation from being inspected so the encrypted information
can still conceal attacks such as oversized payload, coercive
parsing or XML injection [6].
For example, in Thakar et al. [7], the requests for WSs
were simulated on honey-pots and a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classifier but they were only able to intercept SOAP
requests in identifying few attacks such as the SQL injection
and XML DoS attacks. In another study, Chan et al., [8]
focused only on XML-related attacks, where the authors
derived fuzzy association rule models for segregating known
XML data-based attack patterns, but only covered SQL in-
jections, buffer overflows, and SOAP oversized payloads.
In effort to detect more attacks at the service layer, this
paper proposes an Online Adaptive Deep-Packet Inspector
(O-ADPI) model that is specifically targeted for web service
massage attacks in order to effectively counter tag injection
attacks, XML injection, JSON injection, XML Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks as well as HTTP Parameter Pollution
(HPP) attacks. The goal of the proposed WS-IDS is to com-
plement existing ID/IP systems, which are mainly network-
based and do not address the SOAP/REST and XML/JSON-
related payload attacks. The methodology utilizes multiple
statistical methods which include Unigram-based Weighting
Scheme (UWS) that combines text mining techniques and
a supervised intrusion detection algorithm based on maha-
lanobis distance map classifier for web service layer security.
In summary, the main contributions of our research are:
• O-ADPI can handle high-dimensional information in
SOAP/REST web services base on XML/JSON data
payload, where most of the approaches that exist cannot.
As mentioned later, most of the existing approaches can
only handle HTTP payload as low application level.
• O-ADPI uses a Feature Selection Engine (FSE) that
is able to uncover feature subspaces effectively and
efficiently to detect anomalies embedded in sub-
spaces where most of the high-dimensional information
anomalies occur.
• O-ADPI is an online system for detecting anomalies that
is computationally efficient to operate in real time, in
environments with large bandwidth
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews the related works in Host and Network Intrusion
Detection (ID) and Intrusion Prevention (IP) systems. Section
3 describes sample attacks of web services, mainly focused
on different types of REST-based web service attacks. Sec-
tion 4 presents the proposed Online Adaptive Deep-Packet
Inspector (O-ADPI) model along with the anomaly detection
techniques. Section 5 presents the experimental design, eval-
uation and results respectively with the simulation of REST-
IDS dataset 2015 including the computational and speed
scalability tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In general, there are two major detection methods among the
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), which are the signature-
based and anomaly-based [9] and [10]. The signature-based
intrusion detection (SID) includes a database of defined
signatures for matching strings against the attacks. Hackers
would then craft attack variants to beat the signature strings
or enhance the attacks to exploit new vulnerabilities. When-
ever SID becomes short, anomaly-based intrusion detection
(AID) attempts to close the holes. AID is a newer approach
as compared to SID in the fight against misuse and exploits.
However, AID is not a cure-all. When it is used along with
an influential SID solution, it becomes an influential tool for
network protection.
Reviews on related works in IDSs within the context
of web service security as well as a branch of network
security, along with data mining/machine learning and sta-
tistical models concerning the location of attacks, IDSs and
common protocols, the works can be generally categorized
into two categories; IDSs for (1) web applications and (2)
web services. Because both categories contain overlaps and
high similarities, understanding their differences is crucial
in recognizing the importance of intrusion detection in web
services.
Within the first category of IDSs for web applications,
most research focuses on monitoring the HTTP packets and
methods to infer the web-based attacks over payload of
network traffic [11], [12], [13], [14] and [15]. The payload
request and response are part of web application behaviors,
hence the relationships between its features. The research
deeply inspects web applications to comprehend a web ap-
plication’s normality and abnormality by its critical points.
The abstraction emerges from web servers and the underlying
protocols in this category as well.
Works throughout this category include the use of chunk
as a small payload to detect content-based threats on
application-level protocols, such as HTTP and FTP [16].
In another study, Juvonen et al. [17] proposed an online
anomaly detection system that could detect web server log at-
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TABLE 1. IDS Research in Web Applications
IDS Model/source Techniques
TMAD Kakavand et al [13] TMAD uses n-gram text cate-
gorization (TC) which serve as
the commonly term weighting
schemes.
N-gram Analysis [14] N-gram Analysis applies three
n-gram techniques such as χ2
distance statistical test, Ad-hoc
n-gram distance, and pattern
counting to the problem of HTTP
attack detection.
Automatic Generation [15] This model relies on the use of a
service-specific, semantic-aware
anomaly detection scheme that
combines stochastic learning with
a model structure based on the
protocol specification.
Online Anomaly Detection
Juvonen [17]
Online Anomaly Detection uses
three different techniques includ-
ing random projection, princi-
ple component analysis and dif-
fusion maps for anomaly detec-
tion.
Auto-encoders (AEs) [18] AEs model using deep auto-
encoder as the automatic fea-
ture learning and an unsuper-
vised feature learning approach
for both malware classification
and network-based anomaly intru-
sion detection.
A multi-classifier [19] Multiple classifier systems use
a Bayesian detection method
which applies N-grams to extract
feature patterns of both the nor-
mal and attack payload from the
HTTP traffics.
tacks using three different techniques including random pro-
jection (RP), principle component analysis (PCA), and dif-
fusion maps (DM). The results from three methods showed
that their approach can be used to reduce dimensionality
before detecting anomalies. However, before logging, the
system cannot detect attacks that jeopardize the safety of a
web application. [18] proposed an Autoencoder-based fea-
ture learning called Auto-encoders (AEs), where it produces
a model for studying the hidden representation of various
function sets with an unsupervised malware classification
learning strategy.In a similar research work of malicious
payload detection, [19] examined a multi-classifier malicious
payload detection system, where the System utilizes two
additional techniques of detection, based on Bayesian infer-
ence to extract features and a multi-feature-vector to predict
whether the incoming payload is anomalous or normal. These
researchers focused on the packet payload anomaly detection
from HTTP traffic, but the main drawback of these systems
is that they are not suited to high dimensional data as we
attempt in this paper. Table 1 summarizes the research works
for the first category, web applications. Further references
to surveys on anomaly-based detection system are available
from [20] and [21].
The second category of IDS research is the web services.
Although this category is smaller than research in web appli-
cations, few researches that fit within this category includes
works by Thakar et al., [7] and Chan et al., [8]. However,
both researches are not considered as a defense-in-depth
web service security to detect bad payload embedded in
a web service. Other works such as Yee et al., [22] and
Wang and Iacono [23] proposed IDS for web services from
the theoretical perspective. Lee and Mehta [24] examined
the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) attack in REST web
services and proposed a basic input validation method for
JSON message in order to prevent input injection attacks.
This implies the message would still be discarded if a hacker
registers as legitimate users and performs assaults through
data input. While all these methods can be effective in
stopping the aforementioned attacks, at that stage in time,
there are no statistics in both instances to demonstrate that
their methods are effectively significant in terms of detection
speed and performance of applications. At present, there is
no known anomaly detection system available and tailored to
detect XML and JSON attack payloads against web service
applications.
To fill the gap, this paper presents a new IDS model
called the Online Adaptive Deep-Packet Inspector (O-ADPI)
to detect web service anomalies from high-dimensional data.
The proposed O-ADPI model constructs a Unigram-based
Weighting Scheme (UWS), a set of Payload Feature Con-
struction (PFC), and Payload Weighting Scheme (PWS),
and uses a dimensionality reduction technique based on the
Principle Component Analysis (PCA) to enhance the per-
formance of IDSs with multiple criteria. This is to allow
feature selection from all subspace areas where there are
subspace anomalies to get all PWS. Models are built by mean
of supervised approach, namely, Mahalanobis Distance Map
(MDM) classifier.
III. WEB SERVICE ATTACKS
A web service is a software system intended to promote
machine-to-machine communication over a network, accord-
ing to W3C [25]. There are two popular existing web service
technologies; SOAP-based services and REST-based services
[26]. Most of the web services are using traditional sim-
ple object access protocol (SOAP), based on the Extensi-
ble Markup Language (XML) protocol is responsible for
information transfer; Web Services Description Language
(WSDL) that describes the functions of a web service, how
it communicates and where it can be found, including the
web service registry, which is the Universal Description,
Discovery and Integration (UDDI) [27].
As compared to SOAP, which is the Web service’s heavy-
weight preference despite the limits mentioned, REST-based
web services are easier to use along with many other ad-
vantages [28]. REST-based web services requires no expen-
sive tools, smaller learning curve, effective by using smaller
message formats and quick because there is no need for
comprehensive processing.
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In many practices, REST uses the Uniform Resource Iden-
tifiers (URIs) to communicate additional metadata as per
the nature of an HTTP request; and uses GET, PUT, POST,
DELETE methods (verbs) to remotely select, update, insert,
and delete the resources through web services. In addition,
representation of REST is a resource serialization in a given
format, such as the XML and JSON. Theoretically, a resource
representation reflects almost any details about the state of a
resource. This paper focuses on the REST services to cater
the migration of platforms among many service providers
from the SOAP-based services to REST-based services [26].
At present, there is inadequate evaluation to countermea-
sure on REST payload attacks. Consider an e-commerce web
service scenario used in online banking, whereby a web
service collects the account information of the client and
authenticates at the same moment. Next, from the database
the client receives his account credit. To acknowledge the
targeted and characteristic features of attacks by web services
is crucial for an IDS to be able to identify the REST-based
web service attacks. Because REST is basically just a web ap-
plication that employs a structured set of principles, there are
many potential vulnerabilities that an intruder could attack
such as via HTTP parameter pollution (HPP), JSON injection
attack, XML content attack, and Tag injection attack.
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP): HPP attack was dis-
covered in 2009 [29]. This attack relies on the throughout
discrepancy by replicating request parameters so as to over-
ride program-specific default values in the URLs. Common
attacks use the and character to mislead backend services
in accepting controlled request variables from the attacker.
Example: To test for HPP vulnerabilities, the same param-
eter can be appended to the GET or POST information but
assigned with distinct values. Suppose that a HPP attack code
is given in Fig. 1. The response page is analyzed to determine
which value(s) was/were parsed. In the above example, the
owner results may show 987, 456, and some combination of
both (987, 456 or 987 456 or [’987’,’456’]). It may also give
an empty result, or error page.
FIGURE 1. A JSON injection attack
JSON Injection Attack: JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) is language independent whereby it uses text-based
data interchange structure. It is a good alternative for trans-
porting / exchanging messages respectively services between
consumers and servers [30]. A JSON injection attack could
lead in sensitive data being disclosed [31]. Example: The
risk is derived from a registered attacker who made client
user profile as a customer with location data through the
website. In this case, the attacker attempts to manipulate the
user information such as the UserId, Username and Email in
order to inject a mimic customer information as shown in Fig.
2. In the essence, the service is fooled into a fake customer
profile. This is a potential safety defect in many REST-based
services at the application level.
FIGURE 2. A JSON injection attack
XML content Attack: XML injection is A method of
attack used to manipulate or compromise the XML request
or service logic. XML injection can cause the insertion of
malicious content into the resulting message/document [6].
Example: The attacker inserts characters (metacharacters
such as (’), (<), (&), (<![CDATA[ ]]>)) within the XML
structures. When the user registers for service; in a standard
request, the application gets the user data. In this case,
the attacker attempts to insert malicious elements into the
concomitant message/document. Thus, the resulting XML
document is not well formed or may be invalid, as shown
in Fig. 3.
FIGURE 3. XML content attacks with metacharacters
Tag injection attack: A tag injection attack is a type of
XML-content-driven threat that has the ability to pressure
the REST-based service hosts into running malicious codes.
This will lead to unwanted condition of the system, such as
an XDoS or a straight crash [32]. Example: A tag injection
attack attempt to falsely terminate a tag. For example, an
attack is injected as parameter content such as in the fol-
lowing message: <empID>98765</empID>. After the attack
was injected, the attacker would properly terminate and force
processing. It is simple to imagine a situation in which
unintended service conduct can result in access to restricted
data as shown in Fig. 4.
Given such attacks in web service layers, current standards
are still insufficient to fulfill all REST security needs. Also,
the REST payload attacks cannot be detected using the tradi-
tional IDSs, hence they should be treated as new threats too.
This calls for a defense mechanism within the web service
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FIGURE 4. XML content attacks with metacharacters
layer to protect REST against many new unknown vulnera-
bilities. The proposed REST mechanism must be sensitive to
such attack payloads.
IV. ONLINE ADAPTIVE DEEP-PACKET INSPECTOR
MODEL
Fig. 5 presents a new anomaly detection model for web
service messages, called the Online Adaptive Deep-Packet
Inspector (O-ADPI). The model is trained using current
information in the first section. The architecture of the model
requires four distinct service payloads (REGISTER, WITH-
DRAW, UPGRADE and TRANSFER) as input. These might
be any structured text files theoretically.
In the second segment, the Unigram-based Weighting
Scheme (UWS) is built using either unlabeled training data
and/or labeled domain expert anomaly instances. UWS is
an assembly of Payload Feature Construction (PFC) and
Payload Weighting Scheme (PWS). Using the n-gram, PFC
converts the web service payloads into a series of feature
vectors while PWS examines the vector space model and
serves as a weighting scheme [33] to enhance the feature
vectors performance. The weights in the systems refer to the
significance of a function in a chosen collection of unique
payloads. The training UWS profile is then saved for later.
In the third segment, PCA algorithm, which is defined as
an orthogonal linear transformation, maps information into a
reduced dimensionality coordinate structure where sub-space
anomalies are probable to occur in high-dimensional space.
Next, the O-ADPI uses multiple criteria, called Feature
Selection Engine (FSE), to select for the subspaces where
subspace anomalies exist in order to obtain PWS. Math-
ematical solutions such as Guttman-Kaiser Criterion (KC)
and FSE applies the Cumulative Criterion (CC) separately
to determine the amount of dominant Principle Components
(PCs), the outcomes of the dimensionality reduction segment
should be maintained according to the assessment.
Finally, for web service attack classification, this research
proposes mahalanobis distance map classifier. The model is
used for estimating an anomaly score for each message in
detection mode. Such a score is a measure of the difference
between the message observed and the model’s anticipated
conduct. The identified anomalies are then presented to the
user.
The model is used for estimating an anomaly score for
each message in detection mode. Such a score is a measure of
the difference between the message being observed and the
model’s anticipated conduct.
FIGURE 5. An overview of O-ADPI
A. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND OPERATION OF
O-ADPI
Fig. 6 shows the O-ADPI model associated with high level
application web service. The model consists of two main
modules: data capture from XML, JSON or a parameter as
payload data, as well as text-based knowledge discovery. In
addition, the structure of the O-ADPI model is also based
on both anomaly and misuse detection techniques, which
essentially what drives the machine.
In this research, the O-ADPI model takes in various kinds
of data format entries produced through the web service by
web applications. As observed in Fig. 6, this component
exposes a web service to receive both XML and JSON
payload from the application services. From the text-based
knowledge discovery point of view, the text mining engine
is designed for payload pre-processing operation. There is a
payload repository for storing all the payload message ser-
vices handled by a text categorizer and a weighting scheme.
From the unigram-based weighting scheme point of view,
two categories (or labels) were defined; normal and attack for
the payload messages to be handled by this module. In order
for a statistical model algorithm (MDM) to learn the classifi-
cation models of the normal and attack categories, it needs
to be previously supplied with a set of training instances
corresponding to payload messages labelled normal or attack.
If an intrusion analyzer detects a possible intrusion attempt,
the adequate action will be taken, which generally includes
raising a serious alarm with the system administrator and
blocking the last action requested by the dubious user, as well
as updating the inputs and payload emails to the database
of the attack signature. Moreover, in accepted payload mes-
sages, it will duplicate inputs onto normal profile database.
Next, the operation of the proposed anomaly detector for
web service message attacks is described by considering the
transaction flow during a web service message attack.
B. O-ADPI FOR WEB SERVICE MESSAGE ATTACKS
In order to illustrate web service message attacks, Fig. 7
shows an instance of payload transaction flow based on
specific services for a particular site in order to compute its
own “site-specific” service payload anomaly detector. Within
this context, the set of four service messages are:
• SW as the WITHDRAW service message
• SR as the REGISTER service message
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FIGURE 6. An overview of O-ADPI
• SU as the UPGRADE service message
• ST as the TRANSFER service message
As shown in Fig. 7, by analyzing the weight scores of
SW, replicate request parameters/variables and parameter
pollution attacks can be detected. In this service, attacker uses
the "&" character to mislead backend services in accepting
attacker-controlled request variables.
By validating weight scores SR, It is possible to detect ma-
licious content and buffer overflow attacks. Promptly register
request is prevented (Fig. 7, [SR]). By validating the service
payloads SR such as userid, password, email, and username,
all XML-related attacks can be detected and prevented (Fig.
7, [SR]).
In the case of JSON injection attack, consider an intruder
who uses the client user profile as a customer and locations
data through the SU (refer Fig. 7, [SU]). In this case, the
attacker attempts to re-enter the user information such as
the Accountnumber, Username and Email in order to inject
mimic information customer. In the essence, the service is
fooled into a fake customer profile, which is a potential
security defect in REST-based services at the application
level.
Next, in ST, (Fig. 7, [ST]) a Tag injection attempt to
falsely terminate a tag. For example, an attack is injected
as parameter content such as in the following message:
<empID>98765</empID>. After the attack was injected, the
attacker would properly terminate and force processing. It
is simpler to imagine a situation where this can lead to
unintended service behaviour, e.g. restricted data access. As
each request for service comes with a particular weight score,
when different request is entered, the weight score then varies
according to service request regardless whether the inputs are
benign or malicious.
Based on this example, the steps of a payload transaction
flow with specific services can be described as follows:
Step 1: The service message is delivered from client site.
• In SR case, client submits userid, password,
email, username .
Step 2: The service message values are transmitted to web
application server.
Step 3: The weighting score is assigned to service mes-
sage.
Step 4: Evaluating the weighting value to accept or reject
the message.
• If the weight value is valid, the normal transac-
tion is allowed to proceed.
• If the weight value is invalid (malicious), then
the transaction is rejected.
Step 5: The malicious message rejected is considered as
anomaly for prevention step.
• Malicious transaction information onto attack
signature database.
This scenario will be repeated for different web service
messages (SW, SR, SU and ST) following the sequence in Fig.
7.
C. DETECTION TECHNIQUES
The intention of this study is to develop and execute a pre-
cise and effective method to safeguard web service message
from suspecting massages. The approach is based on content
analysis of service messages captured on the web service.
The O-ADPI model uses four techniques for constructing
models of normal web service messages, all of which rely
on content-based unigram weighting scheme analysis by
utilizing principle component analysis, feature selection en-
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FIGURE 7. An overview of O-ADPI
gines and a supervised statistical model, called Mahalanobis
distance map.
1) Unigram-based weighting scheme (UWS)
The weight of a function f in a class reflects f bigoted capac-
ity to standard and attack classes. The greater the weight, the
higher this feature’s in discriminating the strength to identify
the cases of anomaly. Because of its nature, Payload-Feature
Vector is a stack of characters used as a unigram, the tf-
idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency) weighting
method, a commonly used technique in the domain of text
mining, is used to measure the weight of feature for each
class. The tf-idf weight is a statistical measure used to evalu-
ate the importance of a term to a document in a collection
or corpus. The importance increases proportionally to the
number of times a term appears in the document but is offset
by the frequency of the term in the whole corpus.
For a feature, the term frequency (tf) is just the number
of times it appears in each payload packet. This count is
standardized to give the packet payload a measure of signifi-
cance for the function. Standardization is performed to avoid
a bias towards the class with a larger number of features that
may have a higher term frequency regardless of the actual
significance of those features in the class.The tf for feature
fi in payload pj is as defined in Eq. (1):
tf ij =
N (pj , fi)
N (pj)
(1)
where N(pj , fi) denotes the number of occurrences of fea-
ture fi in payload pj and N(pj) is the number of occurrences
of all features in payload pj .
The inverse document frequency (idf) is an indication of
the overall significance of the term. The idf for feature fi
in payload pj is described as the reverse proportion of the
classes included fi. The logarithmic shape of this proportion
is normally used for scaling purposes as defined in Eq. (2):
idf i,j = log
N
|pj , where fi ∈ pj | (2)
where N corresponds to the total number of payloads and
|pj , wherefi ∈ pj | is the number of packet payloads that
contain fi. Finally, the tf − i df weight of feature fi with
regard to payload pj is the product of tf i,j and idf i,j , as
defined in Eq. (3):
wfi , pj = tf i,j .idf i,j (3)
2) Principle Component Analysis (PCA)
One of the most common dimensionality reduction methods
is the primary component analysis. The objective is to depict
the data contained in the initial corresponding variables using
a narrower amount of independent variable named principal
components [34].
For the initial data matrix to conduct PCA X =
[x1x2 . . . xn], the matrix is first centered to form the matrix
zm = [(x1 − x) (x2 − x) . . . (xn − x)]. Covariance matrix
Cx =
1
n−1Xzm X
T
zm, then the oriented data is calculated.
The following decomposition can be used for real-valued
matrices as described in Equation (4):
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Λ W = CxW (4)
Next, Cx is then broken down into a matrix W and a
diagonal matrix Λ.Consequently, Λ and W are usually cate-
gorized throughout climbing down order against the variance
contributed for every element.The columns of the matrix
W indicate the particular eigenvectors (i.e., the principal
components) from the covariance matrix Cx, along with
the factors across the diagonal of the matrix Λ including
the placed eigenvalues connected with the corresponding
eigenvectors inside the matrix W .Like a linear mathematical
method, PCA can be enhanced depending on eigenvector-
based multivariate evaluation.
3) Feature Selection Engine (FSE)
Feature selection techniques provide a way to reduce com-
putational time, increase efficiency of predictions and infor-
mation comprehension in machine learning applications. The
focus of feature selection (variable elimination) is to pick
a subset of variables from the input that can describe the
input information effectively while decreasing noise impacts
or irrelevant variables and still provide excellent predictive
outcomes [35]. The O-ADPI model uses two mathematical
solutions, which are Cumulative Criterion and Guttman-
Kaiser Criterion to be applied independently during the PCA
stage to determine the number of dominant principle compo-
nents (PCs).
Component selection based on Guttman-Kaiser Crite-
rion: The Guttman-Kaiser criterion [36] that is related to
every single factor is displayed by the corresponding eigen-
values. Principal components associated with eigenvalues are
extracted from a covariance matrix. The rules propose to hold
only principal components as they are the eigenvalues larger
than 1. While 1 might be considered as the average variance
for the standardized data, the rule has been modified in order
to select PCs derived from the covariance matrix as follows
in Eq. (5):
KC =
256∑
i=1
σ2i
256
(5)
Nonetheless, the components which are larger in magni-
tude than the average of the eigenvalues are preserved. In the
case of eigenvalues extracted from a covariance matrix, the
average is determined using above equation.
Component selection based on Cumulative Criterion:
The respective own value represents an energy connected
with a component. The higher the individual value, the
greater the energy of the corresponding component (eigen-
vector).The respective own value represents an energy con-
nected with a component. The higher the individual value, the
greater the energy of the corresponding component (eigen-
vector). Suppose Λ = {λ1, λ2, . . . , λ256} that are eigen-
values that decomposed from the covariance matrix Cx .
Cumulative Criterion (CC) is used exclusively and to sample
TABLE 2. Performance metrics for classification evaluations
IDS
Model/source Techniques Formula
Precision
It is the fraction of data
instances predicted as
positive that are actually
positive
TP
TP+FP
True Positive
Rate Sensitivity
(Recall)
Intrusions that are suc-
cessfully detected by the
IDS.
TP
TP+FN
False Positive
Rate
Normal behavior that is
wrongly classified as in-
trusive by the IDS.
FP
FP+TN
Accuracy
It is computed as the ra-
tio between the number of
correctly detected attacks
and the total number of
attacks.
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
F-value
For a given threshold, the
F-value is the harmonic
mean of the precision and
recall at that threshold.
Recall.Precison
Recall+Precision
corresponding k2 principal components (the eigenvectors of
matrix W ). The cumulative criterion is described by the
amount of energies between the first element and the k 2
element, and it is computed using as defined in Eq. (6):
CC =
k2∑
i=1
λi where k2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . 256} (6)
where CC can be determined subject to the objective
function given in Eq. (7):
CC ≥ α .
k2∑
i=1
λi (7)
Note that is the subspace variation ratio to the origi-
nal space’s total variation. This objective function aims to
achieve a value of k 2 as low as possible while at the same
time attaining a fairly elevated percentage-based value of CC.
For brevity, the steps of the Feature Selection Engine (FSE)
is illustrated in Fig. 8.
Based on Fig. 8, once the eigenvalues are collected from
the covariance matrix, two different feature selection tech-
niques will be applied, which are the Kaiser Criterion on one
hand, and the Cumulative Criterion on the other hand. Next,
the feature module is used for refinement and assessment. In
the phase of refinement, the range of the selected principal
components is extended and the discriminative power of the
subsets of principal components to represent massages is
observed. Lastly, the final PCs ∈ k1, k2 are selected through
a reiterative process of normal training model using the F-
value as defined in Table 2.
In addition to Table 2, Precision indicates how many events
an IDS predicts as anomaly, but they are the genuine attacks.
A low accuracy value implies a greater level of false positives
and vice versa. Recall measures the missing part of the
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FIGURE 8. Schema of the proposed feature selection engine (FSE)
TABLE 3. Confusion matrix
Predicted Class
Normal Attack
Actual Class
Normal True Negative False Positive
Attack False Negative True Positive
Precision, namely the percentage of the actual intrusions the
classifier is covering. A reduced recall value is a greater
degree of false negatives and vice versa.
The metrics utilized are True Positive (TP) when the
number of actual attack is classified as an attack, True Neg-
ative (TN) when the number of actual normal is classified
as normal, False Positive (FP) when the number of actual
normal is classified as attack and False Negative (FN) when
the number of actual attack is classified as normal. Table 3
represents the definition of a confusion matrix. Subsequently,
detection and false positive rate can be estimated as shown in
Table 3.
The selected PCs are the one which facilitates the classifier
to achieve the greatest F-value among the candidates k1 and
k2. Then, selected PCs are then used in the Mahalanobis
Distance Map (MDM) classifier.
4) Mahalanobis Distance Map (MDM)
The Mahalanobis Distance Map (MDM) is used to measure
the separation of two groups of objects. In this research,
MDM is used to find similarity between an anomaly and
normal instances. The Mahalanobis distance between the
particular point x and the mean µ of the normal data is
computed as defined in Eq. (8):
dM ←
√
(x− µ)T . Σ−1. (x− µ) (8)
where, X = [x1x2 . . . xn] is set of a given dataset, µ refers
to the average of each feature and Σ−1 is the inverse of the
covariance matrix.
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF THE
MODEL
A. DATASET
One significant issue when assessing proposals linked to IDS
technology is the absence of well-established frameworks for
proper evaluation of experimental outcomes. Many tests are
therefore not reproducible, leading to problems in assessing
the results validity. The DARPA / MIT Lincoln Lab Frame-
work for 1998 and 1999 [37] was an early attempt in this
direction and used for years to evaluate fresh ideas, both in
the field of IDS and in global contests such as Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (KDD).The DARPA dataset has
now been considered outdated and has been widely criticized
[38] due to the nature of the simulation environment that
created the data [39]. Moreover, the features of both the
attacks and ordinary traffic included in such datasets are
currently mostly outdated. Researchers are urged to set up
their own assessment structure in this scenario, motivating
the experimental design and sharing it to promote the repro-
ducibility of experiments where it is feasible.
B. SIMULATED REST-IDS DATASET 2015
At this point, there is no open access IDS dataset that is
derived specifically from web services, this research gener-
ated a new set of data called the REST-IDS Dataset 2015.
This dataset consists of five days network activities capturing
12,600 packets of data massages. It also contains 4,200 web
service attacks to allow evaluation of detection systems on
high level web service applications. The dataset was imple-
mented based on open-source code proof-of-concept version.
In order to identify vulnerabilities and to verify the REST-
IDS 2015 dataset, a free and open source cross-platform
automated security testing solution called the soapUI [40]
was employed. One of the features of soapUI is the ability
to automate security testing on attacks using scripts to work
with REST-based web services. The verification process in-
volved:
• Verifying that the attack instance has been correctly
executed
• Determining labels for each normal and attack
• Classifying each attack instance over specific REST
services
The process of generating the new dataset was based
on findings by Shiravi et al. [41], whereby there are four
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important factors that should be considered in order to define
a set of requirements for a new IDS-dataset; whereby the
dataset (1) should not exhibit any unintended property due
to post-insertion of data, (2) must be adequately labeled,
(3) should cover all network interactions, and (4) must be
entirely non-anonymized.
• Dummy Data: This is an XML file having a total
of 3,000 unique records with basic raw data such
as first and last names, addresses, phone and emails.
The data was generated for free from an online web-
site (http://www.generatedata.com/). The request fac-
tory and builders may use this database in order to create
different sets of normal or attack request.
• Services: Based on the given requirements, few REST-
ful web services have been created as the targets for
normal and malicious requests. These services are con-
nected to a database and in practice are there to re-
ceive the data and perform simple operations like de-
serialization and CRUD to database.
• Request Manager: This is the first trigger point from
client-side application. It receives the required service
arguments and the attack type, and then works with
associated request factory to get the request. After that,
it creates an actual HTTP request and sends it to the
server and at the same time logs the request into the
request database as well.
• Request Factory: For each service, there should be
a specific instance from the request factory to handle
creation of the request and its payload. Based on the
given attack type, this component internally calls for an
attack request builder to build the request accordingly.
Therefore, a request factory may need to use multiple re-
quest builders. For example, for this service, the builder
for attack of type A might be different than the builder
for attack of type B.
• Request Builder: This component receives a prelim-
inary request from a factory as an input and tries to
update and modify it in order to build the preferred and
expected request/attack type. Attack Library: This is a
library in which the logic for creating predefined attacks
has been coded.
• Attack: An Attack is an implementation of request
builder type and can be called directly by the request
factories (such as the request builders) or they can be ex-
tended by custom request from the builder components.
Each attack type has its own request builder implemen-
tation in the Attack Library. A complete description can
be found at the Open Web Application Security Project
[42]. In this dataset, the following are the simulated
attacks:
– HPP (HTTP Parameter Pollution
– JSON Injection Attack
– XML Injection Attack (malicious content)
– XML Tag injection
• Request Dataset: This is a file storage (in Microsoft
Excel format) to keep all normal and attack requests
per each service. The request manager is responsible to
insert new requests after necessary validations.
Next, based on the requested schema, the dataset keeps
only few and required fields of a given HTTP request instead
of all of them. This implementation stores a complete request
data in a separate XML file and uses a GUID as key to
link each of the requests from Excel to the corresponding
element within the XML file. This allows the experiment to
ask for other fields whenever necessary. Table 4 provides four
major attack categories that were chosen with regards to the
actions over specific REST-based services against the number
of simulated attacks and number of data packet massages.
We developed REST-IDS Dataset 2015 by build the above
components with the following technologies such as .Net
Framework 4, C# 5, Entity Framework 6.1, Single database
file- SqlServerCompact, WCF (RESTful) and XML.
C. EVALUATION ON DIFFERENT WEIGHTING SCHEME
SERVICES
Note that the weight of a feature score assigned to each
pattern is used to determine whether the feature is anoma-
lous or a normal instance. Table 5 lists all the weighting
scheme values or all data (normal and attack) from different
web services. The features of four service massage data
are computed tf-idf weighting method in the original high-
dimensional space. With regards the quality of the features
shown in Table 5, most of the features derived from different
web services will be assigned different weight scores for
each packet payload. The weight, however, are very diffi-
cult to assess because different services produce different
set of weights or scores values.The results showed that the
specific scores obtained by each of the web service data are
independent from one another. The following are different
combination strategies used to compare the scores:
1) Select the minimum weight score for each feature
2) Select the maximum weight score for each feature
3) Average the weight score of all features
Table 6 shows that all three proposed weight score strate-
gies achieved reasonable values in comparison to the values
obtained for each web service data with its respective class
labels. However, in general, better results are obtained by
averaging all the weight scores.
Next, the TF-IDF weighting scores were used to classify
normal and attack packets. Results for the TF-IDF weight-
ing scores for different web service data with normal and
attack massages are presented in Fig. 10, where the X-axis
represents the number of features and the Y-axis represents
TF-IDF weighting scores values. For all the web services
a) WITHDRAW, b) UPGRADE, c) REGISTER, and d)
TRANSFER, the results showed that the TF-IDF weighting
scores values for normal messages are much smaller than the
TF-IDF weighting scores values for attack messages. These
weight score policies were obtained from the simulated
dataset within the valid range of weight scores. Anomalous
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TABLE 4. Performance metrics for classification evaluations
NO Service names Simulated attacks No. of data packets No. of attacks Total
1 WITHDRAW HPP (HTTP ParameterPollution) 2680 1200 3880
2 UPGRADE JSON Injection Attack 1520 600 2120
3 REGISTER XML Injection Attack 2800 1800 4600
4 TRANSFER XML Tag injection 1400 600 2000
Total All Service All attacks 8400 4200 12600
TABLE 5. Weighting scheme values for all data (Normal and attack) in different services
Feature
All services
(a) WITHDRAW (b) UPGRADE (c) REGISTTER (D) TRANSFER
Normal Attack Normal Attack Normal Attack Normal Attack
" 0.0000 0.0000 0.1531 0.2085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0049
/ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0019 -0.0024
v 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0035 0.5088 0.4818 0.0000 0.0000
u -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0585 0.0808 -0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0026
t -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0418 0.0583 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0039 -0.0050
m -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0524 0.0720 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0013
e -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0674 0.0936 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0029 -0.0036
0 0.4000 0.5506 0.0069 0.0096 0.4024 0.3971 0.4348 0.5521
< 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0049
r -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0570 0.0795 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0046
? -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
{ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0191 0.0241 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
s -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0241 0.0346 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0022
= -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
c -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0536 0.0777 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0049 -0.0065
6 0.3923 0.6029 0.0033 0.0046 0.3906 0.3768 0.4019 0.5212
3 0.3503 0.5507 0.0037 0.0052 0.2958 0.4446 0.3702 0.5036
a -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0639 0.0895 -0.0038 -0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0063
n -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0546 0.0764 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0039 -0.0049
o -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0589 0.0822 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0039 -0.0052
@ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0114 0.0164 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
f 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0040 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0009
j 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.0063 0.5404 0.5425 0.0000 0.0000
g 0.0000 0.0000 0.0219 0.0292 0.5291 0.5434 -0.0009 -0.0013
TABLE 6. Comparison of minimum, maximum and average obtained by the proposed weighting method based on REST-IDS 2015 evaluation dataset
Strategies
scores
WITHDRAW UPGRADE REGISTER TRANSFER
Normal Attack Normal Attack Normal Attack Normal Attack
Minimum -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0038 -0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0065
Maximum 0.4023 0.6078 0.1531 0.2085 0.5829 3.2789 0.4348 0.6005
Average 0.1626 0.2425 0.0238 0.0327 0.1667 0.1667 0.1473 0.1957
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FIGURE 9. shows the architecture for generating the REST-IDS Dataset 2015 followed by description of each component.
values that contain invalid payload values and out-of-range
REST/SOAP payload can be then identified.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This segment provides the experimental outcomes using the
2015 REST-IDS Dataset for the suggested Online Adap-
tive Deep-Packet Inspector (O-ADPI) model. The experi-
ments were performed based on a standard stratified 10-fold
cross-validation technique to estimate the Area Under Curve
(AUC) for each target class. This is to prevent bias hiding in
the suggested system’s sequential information influencing the
ordinary profile generation and detection efficiency. The re-
sults presented are three-fold; (1) analysis on optimal feature
subspace selection, (2) analysis on detection performance,
and (3) analysis on computational and speed scalability.
A. OPTIMAL FEATURE SUBSPACES
Analysis on the selected or filtered legitimate (normal) traf-
fic was conducted using the Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) algorithm that is designed to determine the optimal
feature subspace for data representation of the entire training
dataset.
Four feature subspaces were chosen with respect to the
normal service payloads; SW, SR, SU and ST, where they were
used in both training and testing phase so as to supply with
accurate representation for all records. Next, the Cumulative
Criterion and Guttman-Kaiser Criterion were employed dur-
ing the election of the optimal feature subspaces. In order
to determine the number of critical PCs to be retained for
various types of web service payloads during the evaluations,
Fig. 11 and Fig. 12 shows the plots for normal SW, SR, SU and
ST service payloads extracted from REST-IDS Dataset 2015
against the Cumulative Criterion and Guttman-Kaiser Crite-
rion, respectively. The figures of horizontal axes represent the
number of PCs and the figures of vertical axes represent their
own values (variances) with respect to the numbers of PCs
displayed on the horizontal axes.
Note that the up-slopes on the plots for SW, SR, SU and ST
service payloads are found lying at different numbers PCs
over the feature selection engines. The same result can also
be seen from the REST-IDS Dataset 2015 evaluation dataset.
However, the numbers of PCs are not always practicable, and
the best performance may be achieved around these numbers.
Next, Fig. 13 shows the potential optimal subspace for
data representation so that the less important PCs can be
eliminated and only the first several critical PCs to be retained
as the new low dimensional feature space.
However, during the training phase, normal profiles were
generated with respect to various types of web service pay-
load. Since the plots of the Cumulative Criterion and Kaiser
Criterion variances only suggest a preliminary result, further
selection is necessary based on the suggestion from the
preliminary outcomes. In this work, we test the potential
optimal subspace of for each type of web service payloads.
Table 7 shows the numbers of PCs used in the potential
optimal subspace for each type of web service payloads.
Normal profiles were built with respect to the chosen feature
subspaces (i.e., the aforementioned numbers of PCs). Then,
the generated normal profiles were utilized during the testing
phase.
B. DETECTION PERFORMANCE
Once the optimal feature subsets have been selected, the
detection performance of the proposed O-ADPI model was
evaluated against both the normal records and the attack
records from the evaluation dataset. The threshold value was
set to 2.5σ, with respect to different normal profiles using
various sets of PCs as shown in Table 7. Note that the best
classification result was classified achieved with the first
selected lower dimensional PCs for SW, SR, SU and ST.
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FIGURE 10. shows the architecture for generating the REST-IDS Dataset 2015 followed by description of each component.
TABLE 7. The number of principle components (PCs)
Name of Service WITHDRAW UPGRADE REGISTER TRANSFER
No. of PCs
Kaiser 11 PCs 23 PCs 39 PCs 12 PCs
Cumulative 8 PCs 15 PCs 25 PCs 7 PCs
FIGURE 11. Guttman-Kaiser Criterion plot variance for REST-IDS Dataset
2015
Table 8 shows the evaluation result for measuring the
trade-off between TF, FP and F-value against different types
of feature selection engines, each with its corresponding
PCs. The proposed detection model enjoyed a promising
performance on REST-IDS Dataset 2015 in TP, FP and F-
value. The performance of the both feature selection engine
achieved high efficiency. At this point, although the detection
performance by O-ADPI dropped significantly across all
FIGURE 12. Cumulative Criterion plot variance for REST-IDS Dataset
2015Figure 12
services except one, but the both feature selection engine still
have the best F-values rate. In order to illustrate a clearer
picture on the relationship between F-values and PCs, Fig. 14
visualizes the trade-off between F-values and the PCs as well
as different feature selection engines on REST-IDS Dataset
2015.
Overall, the proposed O-ADPI model performed very well
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FIGURE 13. shows the architecture for generating the REST-IDS Dataset 2015 followed by description of each component
TABLE 8. Evaluation of REST-IDS Dataset 2015 for four attack types
Services
10 Fold Cross Validation
Feature Selection Engines
Kaiser Rule
PCs
Cumulative
PCsMetrics Metrics
TP FP F-Value TP FP F-Value
WITHDRAW 99.0% 0.76% 99.21% 11 99.40% 0.68% 98.80% 8
UPGRADE 98.75% 0.87% 98.83% 32 99.10% 0.72% 99.00% 15
REGISTER 81.63% 3.20% 98.00% 39 79.67% 8.18% 95.64% 25
TRANSFER 98.93% 0.79% 98.95% 12 98.30% 0.75% 99.38% 7
across all services except one (REGISTER service). The
results are contributed by two factors; (1) the relative fre-
quencies from the Unigram-based Weighting Scheme (UWS)
and (2) the weighting scheme method.
VII. COMPUTATIONAL AND SPEED SCALABILITY
Note that evaluation for computational and speed scalabil-
ity are more challenging and more difficult than feature
extraction. Once an anomaly is discovered in one or more
subspaces, finding its other outer subspaces using current
anomaly detection algorithms is a relatively simple chal-
lenge. The detection of anomalies from information streams
is conducted online in this study while discovering the remote
subspaces of the anomalies is operated offline. Therefore, the
main concern would be how to ensure the speed for the O-
ADPI model is scalable and able to operate in online mode.
This data set (REST-IDS Dataset 2015) contains
XML/JSON messages to a real web service. In these services
there is much more service payloads. Various subsets of the
data are used to test the speed and especially the scalability
of the O-ADPI model methodology to compare the efficiency
on larger datasets. However, the size of the service payload
is big enough (Up to 12,000 service payloads) to test the
scalability aspects. However, we expect to be much less in
the throughput than we used in real time for comparison.
Because real-time performance is of primary importance
to any intrusion detection system, the O-ADPI was evaluated
for speed efficiency by comparing the O-ADPI throughput
with a similar environment used in a medium-sized web
services corporation. The throughput comparison was based
on the number of service payloads processed through such a
web services against the service payload processing speed of
our system considering the most ideal parameters.
Next, Table 9 shows the average processing time (memory
usage) for all service payloads through O-ADPI model in
different service payloads. All of these timings were obtained
on a system with the following configuration.
• CPU: Intel (R) Core (TM) i-7 1.80GHz
• Memory (RAM): 16 GB
• OS: Microsoft Windows 8.1
• System type: 64-bit Operating System
TABLE 9. Performance comparison (time in milliseconds)
Service Name Selection Engine Building Time Testing Time
WITHDRAW
KC 1.043±0.042 0.010±0.038
CC 1.145±0.012 0.013±0.005
UPGRADE
KC 0.426±0.012 0.004±0.005
CC 0.596±0.021 0.006±0.008
REGISTER
KC 4.581±0.121 0.013±0.006
CC 3.566±0.201 0.012±0.005
TRANSFER
KC 0.294±0.019 0.003±0.007
CC 0.296±0.024 0.003±0.001
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FIGURE 14. Trade-off between F-values and PCs
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented the Online Adaptive Deep-Packet In-
spector (O-ADPI) for detecting web service message attacks.
The O-ADPI model works on a high application layer and is
heavily based on an underlying anomaly detector procedure
where a deep-packet inspection is performed. The approach
relies on the use of a service message-specific, Unigram-
based Weighting Scheme (UWS) that combines text min-
ing techniques with a PCA-based Feature Selection Engine
(FSE) using the Guttman-Kaiser criterion and the Cumulative
Criterion to effectively and efficiently explore subspaces in
detecting anomalies embedded in feature spaces. We uti-
lized a supervised intrusion detection algorithm based on
mahalanobis distance map classifier in order to classify web
service attacks into anomaly and normal.
The proposed approach was assessed using the REST-
IDS Dataset 2015. The experimental outcome demonstrated
that the proposed O-ADPI model achieved promising results
in each service message. These tests are important for new
REST-based services for intrusion detection.
The key to the O-ADPI model lies in the statistical ap-
proach for dimensionality reduction and feature selection
in analyzing any web service message produced by various
applications. The effectiveness of detecting anomalies in any
text mining assignment is also evident. In addition, the anal-
ysis can be carried out on enormous amounts of information
in adequate time. Larger volumes of information need to be
analyzed for future studies to guarantee effective scaling. The
system may be throttled by I / O instead of CPU, thus creating
new difficulties.
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